Analyzing the Biden Administration's response to NDAA UAP provision
[This article is free of any AI content]
D. Dean Johnson alerted the UAP twittersphere today to the Biden administration’s releasing their annual statement on the new year’s NDAA. (This is the legislation that contains the highly-debated UAPDA language). Biden’s statements carve out caveats that would in effect enable total noncompliance with the NDAA language’s intent (i.e. even more noncompliance than the ‘gutted’ language was already going to allow for). I noticed that previous years’ NDAAs had similar carve-out language, however I also noticed that past language was not identical to this year’s.
I decided to look through the current year’s cited ‘offending’ clauses and see if any besides the UAP language would trigger the Biden administration’s fresh phrases. If the non-UAP language would reasonably trigger the fresh phrases, then we learn little. But if the non-UAP language wouldn’t reasonably trigger the fresh phrases, then we have guidance from the administration how they are treating UAP language exclusively.
First, here are the highlighted phrases from 3 years’ NDAA statement responses from the Biden administration.
Biden admin statements on NDAAs
2021 (for FY 2022):
earlier clause: “reveal critical intelligence sources or military operational plans”
later clause: “sensitive intelligence sources and methods” or “exceptionally sensitive matters”
2022 (for FY 2023):
earlier clause: “reveal critical intelligence sources or military operational plans”
later clause: “sensitive intelligence sources and methods” or “exceptionally sensitive matters”
2023 (for FY 2024):
earlier clause: “reveal critical intelligence sources or military operational plans”
and
“could implicate executive branch confidentiality interests”
later clause: “sensitive intelligence sources and methods” or “exceptionally sensitive matters”
and
“to preserve the confidentiality of internal executive branch deliberations, particularly those with respect to decisions bearing on the Nation’s national security".”
I label these clauses with arbitrary greek letter labels:
ALPHA: ‘Sources & Methods or military operational plans’
BETA: ‘Exceptionally Sensitive Matters’,
GAMMA: ‘Implicate executive branch confidentiality interests”
DELTA: “Deliberations of Executive branch re. natsec”
We want to see if new Biden admin statement phrases pertain specifically to the UAP language - i.e. are they implicitly telling us how they are treating the UAP topic internally. Accordingly, we are interested in comparing based on this grouping and boolean logic:Compare need for Biden administration to respond with
ALPHA|BETA
against
GAMMA|DELTA
where “|” is the boolean ‘OR’ operator.
Triggering Language from NDAAs
The relevant NDAA language is in sections 856(c), 1221(a)(7), 1269, 1687, 7315, and 7351. All reproduced below in the Appendix. My strategy is to read through each, and see which among responses ALPHA, BETA, GAMMA, or DELTA they would reasonable trigger from the Biden administration. You may have contrary readings, and we all have our biases, so these results reflect mine.
Results
Here are my findings.
856(c) (supply chain vulnerability): ALPHA = 1, BETA = 0, GAMMA = 0, DELTA = 0
1221(a)(7) (recovery of ‘individuals’): ALPHA = 1, BETA = 1, GAMMA = 0, DELTA = 0
1269 (Iran narcotics, IRG operatives): ALPHA = 1, BETA = 0, GAMMA = 0, DELTA = 0
1687 (the UAP language): ALPHA = 1, BETA = 1, GAMMA = 1, DELTA = 1
7315 (unauthorized disclosures): ALPHA = 1, BETA = 1, GAMMA = 1, DELTA = 1
7351 (intel collection adjustments): ALPHA = 1, BETA = 0, GAMMA = 0, DELTA = 0
Conclusion
I found that in addition to the UAP-oriented subsection 1687 in question, that subsection 7315 would also serve to trigger the new phrases in the Biden administration’s annual statement on the current year’s NDAA. Prosaically, the executive might want to keep Congress from knowing about the details of some prosaic intelligence leak regarding politically-sensitive internal deliberations. So I can’t read the new phrases in the Biden admin’s statement as implicitly confirming an internal perception of highly sensitive executive branch interests with regards to the UAP topic, I can only suspect. But this work has significantly narrowed down the list of alternative (i.e. prosaic) triggers to the new phrasing.
By the way, I have to wonder if the need for drafting & including subsection 7315 (you can read it in the appendix below, it’s kind of intriguing) was triggered by all the whistleblowers this year and anticipation of more coming down the pipe in 2024. Others coming from the natsec community who are more familiar with the additions from previous years might be able to tell me if I’m ‘UAP-reading’ too much into that.
I also note that 1221(a)(7), which contemplates recovery of ‘other individuals’ (beyond just US military personnel or civilians) could be read as triggering the GAMMA & DELTA phrases but only if those ‘individuals’ were in the context of a UAP craft retrieval (as opposed to something more prosaic). Therefore this distinction wouldn’t change the practical outcome of this analysis.
PS By the way, the $40 million slush-fund that 1221 appropriates for recoveries of ‘other individuals’ should help soften the operational blow while The Program’s funding for UAP crash retrievals remains cut off when they don’t report all the details to Congress. They might have to leave a crashed craft in the wilderness somewhere, but at least its wayward pilots won’t have to remain on-site to encounter members of the public… or the press. I’m left to wonder whether the administration wasn’t actually trying to call attention to a loophole with their statement to the NDAA? (If so, mission accomplished! ☺ )
I tweet updates, thoughts, & r̶a̶n̶t̶s̶ analysis at @blockedepistem
Appendix: 2023 NDAA (for 2024) language of the 6 sections & analysis
Language eliciting hypothesis:
“1687”
TITLE XVI—SPACE ACTIVITIES, STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, AND INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
Subtitle E—Other Matters
SEC. 1687. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR CERTAIN 19 UNREPORTED PROGRAMS. (a) LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act may be obligated or expended in support of any activities involving unidentified anomalous phenomena protected under any form of special access or restricted access limitations unless the Secretary of Defense has provided the details of the activity to the appropriate congressional committees and congressional leadership, including for any activities described in a report released by the All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office in fiscal year 2024. (b) LIMITATION REGARDING INDEPENDENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.—Consistent with Department of Defense Instruction Number 3204.01 (dated August 20, 2014, incorporating change 2, dated July 9, 2020; relating to Department policy for oversight of independent research and development), independent research and development funding relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena shall not be allowable as indirect expenses for purposes of contracts covered by such instruction, unless such material and information is made available the appropriate congressional committees and congressional leadership. (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: (1) The term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means— (A) the congressional defense committees; and (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives
and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. (2) The term ‘‘congressional leadership’’ means— (A) the majority leader of the Senate; (B) the minority leader of the Senate; (C) the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and (D) the minority leader of the House of Representatives. (3) The term ‘‘unidentified anomalous phenomena’’ has the meaning given such term in section 1683(n)of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C. 3373(n)), as amended by section 6802(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act
ALPHA: 1
BETA: 1
GAMMA: 1
DELTA: 1
Null hypothesis (i.e. exculpatory) candidate language:
”856(c)”:
TITLE VIII—ACQUISITION POLICY, ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT, AND RELATED MATTERS
Subtitle E—Industrial Base Matters
SEC. 856. PILOT PROGRAM TO ANALYZE AND MONITOR CERTAIN SUPPLY CHAINS. (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment shall establish and carry out a pilot program to analyze, map, and monitor supply chains for up to five covered weapons platforms, under which the Under Secretary shall— (1) identify impediments to production and opportunities to expand the production of components of such a covered weapons platform; (2) identify potential risks to and vulnerabilities of suppliers for such covered weapons platforms and ways to mitigate such risks; and (3) identify critical suppliers for such covered weapons platforms.
(b) USE OF TOOLS.—The Under Secretary may use a combination of commercial tools and tools available to the Department of Defense to carry out the program established under this section, including artificial intelligence and machine learning tools to improve data analysis capabilities for such supply chains.
(c) ANNUAL REPORTS.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter until the date specified in subsection (d), the
Under Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report containing— (1) a list of the vulnerabilities of the supply chains for each covered weapons platform selected under subsection (a), categorized by severity of threat or risk to deployment of such a platform; (2) for each vulnerability, a description of such vulnerability, whether such vulnerability has been resolved, and, if resolved, the time from identification to resolution; and (3) an assessment of any efficiencies achieved by addressing impediments to the supply chain.
ALPHA: 1
BETA: 0
GAMMA: 0
DELTA: 0
”1221(a)(7)”:
TITLE XII—MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN NATIONS
Subtitle B—Matters Relating to Other Authorities of the Department of Defense
SEC. 1221. MODIFICATION OF AUTHORITY FOR EXPENDITURE OF FUNDS FOR CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES THAT SUPPORT OPERATIONAL PREPARATION OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND NONCONVENTIONAL ASSISTED RECOVERY CAPABILITIES
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 127f of title 10, United States Code, is amended—
(1) in the section heading, by adding at the end the following: ‘‘and non-conventional assisted recovery capabilities’’;
[1-6 scope summary from BlockedEpistemology: ‘$40M for operations to establish, develop, and maintain non-conventional assisted recovery capabilities to facilitate the recovery of United States military and civilian personnel, or other individuals, who become isolated or separated. Such support may include limited amounts of equipment, supplies, training, transportation, or other logistical support or funding.’]
(7) in subsection (g), as redesignated—
(A) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and
(B) by striking paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) and inserting the following:
‘‘(1) a description of activities carried out for the purposes described in subsection (a);
‘‘(2) the amount of such expenditures;
‘‘(3) an identification of the type of recipients to receive support, including foreign forces, irregular forces, groups or individuals, as appropriate;
‘‘(4) the total amount of funds obligated for such expenditures in prior fiscal years; and’’;
and
ALPHA: 1
BETA: 1
GAMMA: 0
DELTA: 0
1269,
TITLE XII—MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN NATIONS
Subtitle E—Matters Relating to Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan
SEC. 1269. MODIFICATION AND UPDATE TO REPORT ON MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF IRAN AND RELATED ACTIVITIES. Section 1227 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117–81; 135 Stat. 1972) is amended— (1) in subsection (a)— (A) in paragraph (1)(C), by inserting ‘‘ballistic and cruise’’ after ‘‘instances of’’; and (B) in paragraph (2)— (i) in subparagraph (F), by striking ‘‘The United Nations’’ and inserting ‘‘The effect of the United Nations’’; and (ii) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
‘‘(H) Iranian involvement in regional narcotics trade, to include the following:
‘‘(i) Any element of the Government of Iran, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (in this section referred to as the ‘IRGC’) and any Iranbacked group operating in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, or Yemen, that supports the sale, supply, or transfer of narcotics in the Middle East region.
‘‘(ii) The benefits accrued from the sale, supply, and transfer of narcotics in the region by any element of the Government of Iran, including the IRGC and any Iran-backed groups operating in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, or Yemen.
‘‘(iii) All foreign terrorist organizations to or for which the IRGC, or any person owned or controlled by the IRGC, provides material support in the sale, supply, transfer, or production of captagon or other related narcotics or precursors in the Middle East and North Africa.
‘‘(iv) Activities conducted by the IRGC in Afghanistan related to the trade of methamphetamine or opiates, including synthetic opiates.
‘‘(v) All intercepted transfers involving the United States Fifth Fleet of narcotics from Iran or involving Iranian nationals or persons acting, or purporting to act, for or on behalf of the Government of Iran, including the IRGC.
‘‘(I) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-affiliated operatives serving in diplomatic and consular posts, cultural centers, religious institutions, and religious functions outside of Iran and actions taken by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the heads of the elements of the intelligence community (as such 16 term is defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003), consistent with the necessary protections for sources and methods, to reduce the influence of such operations.’’; (2) by redesignating subsection (c) and (d) as subsections (d) and (e), respectively; (3) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new subsection:
‘‘(c) UPDATED REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2024, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an updated report that includes each of the matters listed in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) and covers developments during the period beginning in June 2022 and ending on the day before the date on which the updated report is submitted.’’; and (4) in subsection (d), as so redesignated, by inserting ‘‘, and the updated report required by subsection (b),’’ after ‘‘report required by subsection (a)’’.
ALPHA: 1
BETA: 0
GAMMA: 0
DELTA: 0
”7315”
TITLE III—INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Subtitle A—General Intelligence Community Matters
SEC. 7315. NOTICE AND DAMAGE ASSESSMENT WITH RESPECT TO SIGNIFICANT UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 1105 the following new section (and conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such Act accordingly): ‘‘SEC. 1105A. NOTICE AND DAMAGE ASSESSMENT WITH RESPECT TO SIGNIFICANT UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
‘‘(a) NOTIFICATION AND DAMAGE ASSESSMENT REQUIREMENTS.—
‘‘(1) REQUIREMENTS.—If the Director of National Intelligence becomes aware of an actual or potential significant unauthorized disclosure or compromise of classified national intelligence— ‘‘(A) as soon as practicable, but not later than 7 days after the date on which the Director becomes so aware, the Director shall notify the congressional intelligence committees of such actual or potential disclosure or compromise; and ‘‘(B) in the case of an actual disclosure or compromise, not later than 7 days after the date on which the Director becomes so aware, the Director or the head of any element of the intelligence community from which the significant unauthorized disclosure or compromise originated shall initiate a damage assessment consistent with the procedures set forth in Intelligence Community Directive 732 (relating to the conduct of damage assessments), or successor directive, with respect to such disclosure or compromise.
‘‘(2) CONTENTS OF NOTIFICATION.—A notification submitted to the congressional intelligence committees under paragraph (1)(A) with respect to an actual or potential significant unauthorized disclosure or compromise of classified national intelligence shall include— ‘‘(A) a summary of the facts and circumstances of such disclosure or compromise; ‘‘(B) a summary of the contents of the national intelligence revealed or potentially revealed, as the case may be, by such disclosure or compromise; ‘‘(C) an initial appraisal of the level of actual or potential damage, as the case may be, to the national security of the United States as a result of such disclosure or compromise; and ‘‘(D) in the case of an actual disclosure or compromise, which elements of the intelligence community will be involved in the damage assessment conducted with respect to such disclosure or compromise pursuant to paragraph (1)(B).
‘‘(b) DAMAGE ASSESSMENT REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—
‘‘(1) RECURRING REPORTING REQUIREMENT.— Not later than 30 days after the date of the initiation of a damage assessment pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(B), and every 90 days thereafter until the completion of the damage assessment or upon the request of the congressional intelligence committees, the Director of National Intelligence shall— ‘‘(A) submit to the congressional intelligence committees copies of any documents or materials disclosed as a result of the significant unauthorized disclosure or compromise of the classified national intelligence that is the subject of the damage assessment; and ‘‘(B) provide to the congressional intelligence committees a briefing on such documents and materials and a status of the damage assessment.
‘‘(2) FINAL DAMAGE ASSESSMENT.—As soon as practicable after completing a damage assessment pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(B), the Director of National Intelligence shall submit the final damage assessment to the congressional intelligence committees.
‘‘(c) NOTIFICATION OF REFERRAL TO DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.—If a referral is made to the Department of Justice from any element of the intelligence community regarding a significant unauthorized disclosure or compromise of classified national intelligence under this section, the Director of National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence committees of the referral on the date such referral is made.’’.
ALPHA: 1
BETA: 1
GAMMA: 1 (exec branch may not want Congress to know sensitive internals about it that were leaked)
DELTA: 1 (same)
”7351”:
Title III - Intelligence Community Matters
Subtitle D—Matters Relating to National Security Agency, Cyber, and Commercial Cloud Enterprise
SEC. 7351. CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION BY NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ADJUSTMENTS. The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: ‘‘SEC. 22. CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ADJUSTMENTS.
‘‘(a) NOTIFICATION.—Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director of the National Security Agency determines the occurrence of an intelligence collection adjustment, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a notification of the intelligence collection adjustment.
‘‘(b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: ‘‘(1) CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.—The term ‘congressional intelligence committees’ has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003). ‘‘(2) INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ADJUSTMENT.—The term ‘intelligence collection adjustment’ includes a change by the United States Government to a policy on intelligence collection or the prioritization thereof that results in a significant loss of intelligence.’’.
ALPHA: 1
BETA: 0
GAMMA: 0
DELTA: 0